A Modern History of the Labour Party

Part 1 of 7

1945: Labour's Great Triumph?

By Phil Hearse (Islington North CLP) · Labour Briefing no. 69, p. 6 · read by hand from the scan

With this article on the Attlee government, Labour Briefing begins a new series on Labour Party history. Future topics include Bevanism, Gaitskell's war on Clause Four, the first Wilson government, the Heath years, the Social Contract and the rise of Bennism.

Socialists opposed to the "new revisionism" of Kinnock and Gould often hearken back to the 1945-51 Labour government as if it was the embodiment of the socialist ideal.

But a closer look at history reveals a different picture.

A process of radicalisation had swept through the working class as a result of the 1930s depression and the experiences of the War. Attlee's government therefore came to power not only with a sizeable majority but with a mandate for radical socialist change.

Civil aviation, coal, electricity, gas and the Bank of England were nationalised.

It was widely noted at the time that Tory opposition to these measures was more muted than expected: in some cases they did not even force a Commons division.

Establishment opinion clearly accepted that following the War the reconstruction of British capitalism required that certain public utilities be placed under state direction. In any case, phenomenal amounts of compensation (especially to the coal owners) were awarded — saddling the nascent nationalised industries with a mountain of debt.

These new public sector companies quickly took on the form of huge, monolithic, bureaucratic institutions, completely outside popular control. Indeed, the government explicitly rejected workers' control in industry.

Controversy only broke out when the ruling class thought nationalisation had gone too far. In 1947 there was a bitter battle over road haulage and later over iron and steel and sugar.

The National Health Service, inaugurated in 1948, was a major gain for the working class. It met opposition from the consultant doctors, but from hardly anyone else.

Social security also received a major boost, as did state education. Most of these reforms had been advocated in the Beveridge Report, published during the War, which reflected a broad consensus that economic reconstruction needed a healthy and educated working class.

Attlee's foreign policy, guided by Ernest Bevin, was a model of Cold War Atlanticism. Britain became a founder member of NATO, developed its own nuclear bomb, used its troops on the side of reaction in Greece and Malaya, and sent them into the US war in Korea. De-colonisation was begun (notably the granting of Indian independence) but only hesitantly.

By 1948 the bulk of Labour's reforms had been implemented. Morrison then declared the need for "consolidation", after which the government began to run out of steam.

Labour won the 1950 election but its majority slumped from 148 to six. Labour's social welfare reforms were popular, but it had no further socialist vision of major transformation.

The left's standard bearer, Aneurin Bevan, was a leading member of the first Attlee government, which had generally enjoyed the support of the left in the Party. A real left opposition emerged only after 1950, in response to two issues — the introduction of health service charges and German rearmament.

Even then, only a handful of left MPs (not including Bevan or Michael Foot) opposed the US war in Korea. In 1951 the Tories led by Churchill were returned to power.

Attlee's government has retained its place in Labour's mythology because, unlike the subsequent Wilson and Callaghan governments, it was able to carry through important reforms — many of which are now under threat from Thatcherism.

But the Attlee government's key failing was that it was a government of reforming capitalism. For this reason, the nationalisation of industry which it carried out conformed with the bureaucratic logic of the capitalist system, and not with the needs and priorities of the workers.

While we defend the remaining gains of 1945-51 against Thatcher, we should be under no illusions that a return to 1945 is possible or desirable. Today, a much more radical programme is needed to take the working class forward.

Part 2 of 7

Bevanism: Naked in the Conference Chamber?

By Bob Pennington · Labour Briefing no. 72, p. 7 · read by hand from the scan

Traditional Labour left-wingers were impressed by the achievements of the 1945 Attlee government on the domestic front. But the 1950 Labour government failed to move forward.

Attlee and his cabinet knew that they could only carry out their election programme by having a real showdown with the capitalists.

Drained of ideas, plagued by a balance of payments crisis, and with no stomach for a fight, they went into retreat. The buzz word was "consolidation".

But Gaitskell's budget, which imposed charges on the NHS to finance arms, provoked a revolt of left MPs. Bevan, Wilson, and John Freeman resigned from the cabinet.

Though they assured Attlee they would do nothing to impair party unity, they reserved "their democratic right to debate freely issues of government policy."

With this statement, Bevanism was born, and with it, the contradictions that would dog it until its demise.

Later that year, Labour lost office. The leadership, convinced their previous course was right, had no intention of abandoning its bi-partisan approach. On the big issues — the Bomb, German re-armament, Britain's colonial wars — they offered no opposition to the Tories.

However, the right's grip was weakened. With Labour out of office, a powerful argument for suppressing differences had gone. The ranks wanted to debate why Labour had lost and dissident MPs around Bevan gave the left a focus.

Tough right wing union leaders wielded the block vote with a ferocity which would have delighted Neil Kinnock, Bevan still had considerable support in the unions, notably from construction workers, boilermakers, foundrymen, metal mechanics, tobacco workers, vehicle workers and the Fire Brigade.

Although the Transport Workers was then a right wing bastion, it also housed dock, building and car workers, among the most militant sections of the working class at that time.

Their stewards and leading activists were often Bevan supporters — I remember organising three coach loads of Liverpool dockers to hear Bevan speak in Manchester one Saturday evening in 1955.

But the Bevanites' approach to the trade union question (and the block vote in particular) was inadequate. They increased Tribune's industrial coverage, ran Tribune "Brain's Trusts" which attracted large audiences of Party and trade union members, but shied away from an organised fight against the bureaucracy within the TUC and the unions themselves.

It would have been difficult. The right wing leaders would have declared war, and wars have casualties. But it was the only way to break the power of the right and win fundamental change.

In the 50s, the left-right divide was demarcated by the Bomb. For Gaitskell & Co., the world was divided into two camps: "western democracy" vs. the Soviet bloc. They were totally committed to the west and therefore supported rearmament and the Bomb.

The Bevanites also subscribed to the "two camp" theory. They thought Labour should mediate between the worst excesses of the two great powers and create an alliance with so-called non-aligned countries, like India.

But the acceptance of the "two camp" theory reduced politics to manoeuvre and diplomacy, and marginalised the mass movements.

By 1957, when he was Labour's foreign affairs spokesperson, Bevan believed a deal could be made with the Russians for a nuclear free zone in Europe, policed jointly by NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

So keen was he to get agreement with Khrushchev that, he admitted later, "he had suppressed his temptation to mention Hungary and Poland."

In the new situation created by the Khrushchev "thaw", Bevan saw an opening for negotiation, not unilateralism. The H-Bomb represented Britain's capacity to negotiate.

When the Labour Party Conference debated unilateralism, Bevan opposed it, asking: "Am I to go into the Conference Chamber naked?"

The left inside the Party and the unions was overwhelmingly unilateralist. Having declared for multilateralism, Bevan could no longer claim to be its leader.

It was the kiss of death for Bevanism, already jettisoned by former supporters like Crossman and Wilson. Bevan without Bevanism could not stay the course. Tribune's influence and circulation took a nose dive. A new left had to be built.

Part 3 of 7

The fight against "revisionism"

By Paul Lawson, a pen name of Phil Hearse · Labour Briefing no. 73, p. 6 · read by hand from the scan

Hugh Gaitskell was elected Labour Leader in 1955 by the right-wing majority of Labour MPs.

The left of the Labour Party was then organised around Tribune, edited by Michael Foot, led by Aneurin Bevan.

In 1957, Bevan surrendered, making his infamous "naked into the conference chamber" speech defending British nuclear weapons.

Labour went into the 1959 General Election with a united leadership (Gaitskell and Bevan). Only occasionally would Bevan signal any differences with the dominant right wing.

Despite Labour's unity, the Conservatives won. Tory Prime Minister Harold MacMillan cleverly exploited growing working class prosperity with his claim, "you've never had it so good".

Labour had now been out of power since 1951 and had lost three general elections in a row.

Gaitskell and his "revisionist" co-thinkers like Crosland and Douglas Jay began to wonder — like Kinnock and his co-thinkers today — whether socialism was inherently unpopular and whether mas affluence necessitated a move to the right.

Anthony Crosland, in his book The Future of Socialism argued that the mixed economy and welfare state had "civilised" capitalism, which was here to stay.

At the 1959 Labour Conference, Gaitskell argued that Labour was being kept out of power by "fundamental social forces" — growing working class affluence — to which it must adapt.

He proposed ditching Clause Four, which committed the Party to common ownership of the means of production. The response in the Party was immediate, and particularly in the unions — with the TGWU being adamant against any revision of Clause Four.

Throughout 1960 the battle over Clause Four raged. Gradually, bitterly, Gaitskell came to see that he could not win, or rather that if he pressed the issue and lost, his position as Leader would become untenable.

Eventually, the Gaitskellite right compromised, leaving the consitution intact, but drawing up a statement of "Aims and Values" which "clarified" the modern meaning of Clause Four. Sound familiar?

Now another challenge from the left confronted Gaitskell. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, founded in 1957, grew rapidly in the Labour Party and trade unions.

In February 1960 the Tory government decided to abandon the Blue Streak rocket which was becoming too expensive — leaving Britain without a credible independent nuclear delivery system.

The US promised to supply its Skybolt missile, but did Britain really need an independent deterrent? Gaitskell hesitated; then came down firmly in favour.

At that year's Scarborough Conference, the unilateralist tide was too strong. Gaitskell, in his leaders' speech, refused to accept the motion carried by Conference, and vowed to "fight, fight and fight again".

The Gaitskellite revisionists organised the "Campaign for Democratic Socialism" — the LCC of its day — to work in the constituencies and the unions against CND and the left and thus ensure that Gaitskell would defeat unilateralism at the 1961 Conference.

Many CDS leaders later became leading figures in the SDP (Bill Rogers, for example). In the absence of effective left wing organisation, CDS succeeded. In 1961, unilateralism was rejected.

A new issue now divided the Party — the Common Market. Gaitskell at first was unsure because of his loyalty to the Commonwealth. Finally, he and the revisionist right championed British entry, and a decades-long fight with the left was set in train.

Gaitskell died in 1963. Wilson became Labour Leader, and against the background of a declining economy and Tory scandals like the "Profumo affair" a Labour government was elected in 1964.

Although it included Gaitskellites such as Roy Jenkins and George Brown, it was dominated by ex-Bevanites — like Wilson himself, Barbara Castle and Richard Crossman.

But as we shall see, this wing of the leadership were in practice no more committed to basic socialist change than the Gaitskellites they replaced.

Part 4 of 7

The Labour Government 1964-70: "Let's Go with Labour"

By Phil Hearse (Islington North CLP) · Labour Briefing no. 74, p. 6 · read by hand from the scan

Labour won the 1964 General Election in the midst of a growing realisation that despite the unprecedented prosperity of the 1950s, British capitalism was stagnating. Labour's new Leader Harold Wilson fought the election on the promise that Labour would unleash the "white heat of the technological revolution".

The image of Labour as a modernising party, against the Tories' party of decline, was summed up in Labour's election slogan: "Let's Go with Labour — and we'll get things done."

Ruling class house journals like the Economist and Financial Times backed a Labour government.

Wilson's reputation as an old Bevanite with unilateralist sympathies excited expectations of a "left" Labour government. But just 18 months of Wilson disabused naive expectations.

Labour did repeal the hated Rent Act, giving tenants more security. A mild Race Relations Act was passed.

But on Polaris and NATO Wilson showed no signs of his supposed unilateralism: following the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, the threat of nuclear war was perceived to have retreated; and CND was in decline.

In 1965, the white settler government of Rhodesia, still a British colony, made a declaration of independence — "UDI". Wilson's government took no effective action.

Labour's parliamentary majority was just four. The attempt to renationalise steel was defeated by the defection of two right wing Labour MPs.

Majority

So Wilson went for a second election in 1966, winning a majority of 97, seen as a mandate to push through economic and social change.

Wilson and his Minister of Economic Affairs, George Brown, now presented their "National Plan", which, like the "planning agreements" of the 1970s, proposed an investment pact with capitalism.

Formal agreement of leading industrialists did not, however, produce the needed investment. And the national plan was based on the idea of a rapidly expanding economy, which did not exist.

In fact, the economy was in a massive balance of payments crisis, worsened by the international bankrolling of the Vietnam war. The National Plan was stillborn.

Instead, in return for International Monetary Fund (IMF) support, Wilson introduced a Prices and Incomes Bill with powers to limit and delay wage increases, and lurched towards devaluation of the pound, carried out by Chancellor Roy Jenkins in 1967.

The prices and incomes legislation caused the first major clash with the Labour left, and resulted in the resignation of Technology Minister Frank Cousins, former TGWU General Secretary.

But the real face of Wilson's austerity policy was revealed in 1966 when the government launched a witch-hunt against the striking seafarers.

The NUS called a national strike for a living wage. Wilson witch-hunted the NUS Strike Committee, which included Communist Party members and sympathisers, as "a small, tightly-knit group of politically motivated men." The red-scare witch-hunt broke the strike.

Austerity

Apart from austerity measures, the political price paid for IMF's support for the British economy was Labour's shameful support for the Vietnam war.

Following the first bombing of North Vietnam in 1964, Wilson came under left pressure to disassociate Britain from US actions. He refused. Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart lamely repeated all the propaganda of Lyndon Johnson's government about "Communist aggression".

The Parliamentary Labour left complained, but they were at a low ebb. The Tribunite left had still not recovered from the capitulation to the right by Nye Bevan a decade earlier.

Decline

Disillusionment with Wilsonism at this time led to a drastic decline of local Labour Parties, compounded by the lack of fight by the parliamentary left.

But the growing mobilisation of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, and the rising student movement, were producing a new left, outside, and hostile to, the Labour Party.

The ultra-leftism of much of this movement, and its complete evacuation of the Labour Party, resulted in the almost unnoticed takeover of the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS) by the tiny Militant tendency in 1968.

The consequences of complete abandonment of Labour by the hard left were to allow Militant to play a disproportionate role in the late 1970s and beyond.

Three issues emerged at the end of Labour's period in office which highlighted the cycle of economic decline and social crisis in which British capitalism was locked.

• In 1968, Enoch Powell made his infamous "rivers of blood" speech, the first time a senior figure had openly raised the right wing racist flag in post-war mainstream politics.
• The growing civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was met in August 1969 with an RUC-Loyalist Belfast pogrom, in which dozens were killed and hundreds of Catholic houses burnt.

Failure

The failure of the old Cathal Goulding IRA to defend the nationalist areas led directly to the formation of the Provisional IRA. Home Secretary James Callaghan dispatched British troops, allegedly to "defend the Catholic areas".

• In 1968 came In Place of Strife, the first post-war attempt at anti-union legislation, devised by Wilson and his Bevanite chum Employment Secretary Barbara Castle.

Eventually, in face of trade union opposition and a hopelessly split cabinet, Wilson was forced to withdraw the legislation. But the affair was highly instructive about the future trend of British politics.

Wilson's government was defeated at the polls in June 1970, a failure not only in socialist terms but from the viewpoint of making any significant modernising change.

Part 5 of 7

Labour in opposition 1970-74

By Steve Roberts · Labour Briefing no. 76, p. 6 · read by hand from the scan

On June 18th 1970, Edward Heath was elected against all odds.

The labour movement was devastated.

The years that followed were to usher in a great wave of class struggle which, for the first time in British history, overthrew a government and brought to power a Labour Party pledged to "an irreversible shift in wealth and power to working people."

Heath's strategy for the 70s was to point British capitalism firmly in the direction of the European market.

The apparatus of the Wilson years, most particularly the Prices and Incomes Board, was to be scrapped. The combination of rising unemployment and new legislation would force the trade union leadership to crack down on unofficial strikes and undermine workplace organisation.

British capitalism, freed of Keynesian inhibitions, would expand into a bright new European future.

It was Heath, not Thatcher, who was the first to try to break the post-war mould. But Heath faced a far more powerful obstacle than did Thatcher a decade later.

The trade union movement was at the height of its post-war strength. Over ten million trade unionists were organised in the TUC. Rank and file organisation and the number of shop stewards were still growing.

The section of the trade union leadership which had based itself on that development, notably Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon, were soon to dominate their unions and the TUC.

The ferocity of the government's initial assault rocked the labour movement.

First, the postal workers' strike was smashed. After organising a huge national demonstration against the Industrial Relations Bill in February 1971, the TUC suspended further action.

In the summer, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) went into liquidation. In the autumn, the engineering union, after a campaign of factory occupations, abandoned its national claim and settled for local bargaining. In one year, unemployment doubled to over one million.

The government, cock-a-hoop, imposed the "N-1" incomes policy. Wage settlements were to be reduced, first from 8% to 7%, and then further deductions.

In the space of six weeks, the miners' strike was to shatter Heath's illusions.

In the previous 15 years, half a million miners had been made redundant; 250,000 remained. The right wing leadership of Will Paynter, which had presided over this decline, opposing all industrial action, was now under challenge from the left, reflected in the election of Lawrence Daly as the union's Secretary.

The initial signs were not favourable. The strike vote was not overwhelming. Coal stockpiles were high. The TUC refused active support.

But a new strength was infusing the union's Area leaderships. Under their guidance, and particularly that of the Yorkshire Area, a vast system of flying pickets, drawing in 40,000 workers, closed off the stockpiles from the power stations.

On February 10th 1972, engineering workers in Birmingham went on unofficial strike and 10,000 marched to the gates of the Saltley stockpile. The police were forced to shut the gates. The flying pickets were in control.

A state of emergency declared by the government only succeeded in polarising public opinion on the side of the miners. At the start of the strike the press was sure that the miners would be forced to abide by the 7% norm. Six weeks later they won 30%.

With its economic policy in ruins, the government now turned to its new industrial legislation to hold back the tide. But the fatal flaw built into the Industrial Relations Act soon became evident.

The government had wished to stand aloof from day-to-day industrial conflicts. The legislation was therefore drafted so that employers could take action against unions through the courts.

But this also meant that the government ceded most of its control over industrial disputes. The first moves of the new National Industrial Relations Court ended in fiasco as an NIRC-ordered ballot in the rail industry ended in an overwhelming rejection of the employers' offer.

Then, five dockers were jailed for refusing to appear before the NIRC. On Monday July 24th, dockers marched on Pentonville prison, and on Wednesday the TUC threatened a national strike if the Pentonville Five were not released. They were.

The economic gains for the dockers, the miners, and, potentially, the rest of the working class were significant. But could the labour movement wring full political capital from its victory?

While the trade union movement was at the height of its strength, the Labour Party was in the pits. Between 1964 and 1970 there had been a sharp decline in the Party's strength.

The number of branches with over 2,000 members had been cut from 66 at the beginning of the Wilson government to 22 at the end, as rank and file activists lost heart.

The Party leadership was in ideological disarray. The issue of Europe had split the Party, with what was to become the SDP emerging under the leadership of Roy Jenkins and Bill Rogers.

For the right, European entry was increasingly placed above loyalty to the Party and the labour movement.

Wilson seemed paralysed, unable to confront the challenge from the right, and bereft of a convincing policy to replace that which had led to such unexpected disaster in 1970.

The way was open for the left. Through his association with the UCS struggle, Tony Benn rose to prominence as the champion of the left in the Party. UCS was Benn's own creation, one of the rationalisation projects achieved in his MinTec days under Wilson.

But Benn now started to forge stronger links with the unions, often giving support to struggles, such as the miners', which were spurned by the rest of the Party leadership, and formulating a new industrial policy for the Party.

Benn summarised his policy in the call for "a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of the working people and their families."

Buttressed by the call for the nationalisation of the top 25 monopolies, this policy became the backbone of the 1973 Labour manifesto, the most radical since the 30s.

The adoption of the manifesto reflected the tremendous leftward pressure being exerted from the Party base. Denis Healey adapted himself to the new mood with his slogan of "squeezing the rich until the pips squeak."

But while all this reflected the activity of the mass movement, it still failed to grapple with the fundamental question of those years — the question of the legitimacy of the state and its laws, powerfully underlined by the coup in Chile.

The Party leadership firmly rejected all confrontations with the law. The left, at best, vacillated. Benn said of the UCS struggle:

"There are two ways forward, one is to carry on working while it is legally possible... The other is choose a dead-end clash with the law. This has been clearly and rightly ruled out in all the statements of the UCS leaders."

The combination of an upsurge in industrial struggle and a move to the left in the Labour Party could have given birth to a movement for the overthrow of the government, despite the opposition of the Labour leadership.

Instead, that potential was sacrificed to the needs of an alliance between left Labourites and left trade union bureaucrats.

It was left to the miners to carry forward the political momentum of the labour movement. The second miners' strike of February 1974, while trade unionist in form, was profoundly political in content.

Though the heroic mass struggles of two years earlier were mostly absent, the miners were nevertheless not only confronting the policies of the government — they were fighting for its overthrow.

Heath went to the country on the issue of "Who rules?" and the country answered: "Not you!"

For the moment, the establishment was crushed. The Tories were bewildered. The new government had the support of a powerful trade union movement, ready for mobilisation. The radical policies of the 1973 manifesto could have been implemented.

But the moment was lost. Priority was given to "maintaining the confidence of British industry." The government turned to the trade union leaders to bolster that confidence.

The dynamic of the anti-Tory movement, lacking political or organisational focus, began to evaporate. The Social Contract was in gestation.

Part 6 of 7

How Labour paved the way for Thatcher

By Ken Stratford · Labour Briefing no. 77, p. 7 · read by hand from the scan

In February 1974 a minority Labour government was elected.

Heath had gambled on beating the miners at the ballot box and failed.

Wilson called another election in October, and although this time Labour won a slim Parliamentary majority, the government was dogged throughout its 1974-79 terms by the absence of a stable, working majority.

This enabled the ruling class to put enormous pressure on the government, particularly in the 1974-76 period, when the Tories used their control of the Lords to frustrate progressive legislation.

The ruling class also staged an investment strike and presided over a massive flight of capital from the country. Within three years unemployment had doubled from its pre-election level of 680,000.

In the face of capitalist pressure, the government had two choices.

On the one hand, it could seek to implement its "radical" 1974 Manifesto, with pledges to extend public ownership, repeal reactionary legislation, and extend workers' rights and benefits.

Down that road lay a confrontation with the ruling class. It would undoubtedly have meant that real steps would have to be taken against capitalist property, the banks, and the House of Lords.

On the other hand, the government could drop its manifesto, get the working class under control, and stifle its demands — until the Tories had recomposed themselves under their new leadership.

The advances of 1974 and early 1975, including the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act and new equality legislation, were followed by the Social Contract. This was a voluntary agreement between the government and TUC to limit wage rises.

In theory, wages were to be held down so that the "social wage" — the Welfare State — could be preserved and state funds directed to tackling unemployment.

In practice, however, unemployment continued to rise. In July 1976, Denis Healey, as Chancellor of the Exchequor, imposed £1,000 million public spending cuts at the behest of the International Monetary Fund.

By 1977, the Social Contract had burst at the seams. Neither Hugh Scanlon nor Jack Jones, "left" leaders of the AUEW and T&GWU, whose support underpinned the whole strategy, could impose a third year of wage restraint. Their union conferences voted for "a return to free collective bargaining".

A wave of industrial battles broke out. The Grunwick workers demanded the right to trade union organisation and the Leyland toolmakers defended their pay differentials.

In the famous "winter of discontent" of 1978/9, low paid public sector workers took action against Healey's attempts to limit pay rises and cut public spending.

Meanwhile, the long-running battle over EEC membership had come to a head. The Party had promised in the October 1974 Manifesto to hold a referendum on EEC membership. The right wing supported membership; the Tribune MPs, along with Scanlon and Jones, were opposed.

The majority of the NEC opposed the Common Market and a special Party Conference in April 1975 voted by 65% to 35% to recommend a "no" vote in the referendum which was held in June 1975.

The majority of the cabinet came out in favour of a "yes" vote and the "left" NEC acquiesced by agreeing that both sides could campaign openly for their preferred option.

The left missed its chance to mobilise the widespread working class opposition to the EEC on a class basis. The result was predictable: a two to one majority for EEC membership.

In the process, Wilson sacked Eric Heffer from his Ministerial post for speaking against the EEC before the Referendum campaign was underway. He further strengthened the right by moving Tony Benn from the Industry Ministry into the Department of Energy.

Callaghan replaced Wilson in 1976. The same year the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act was first introduced by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins.

The government also maintained the Official Secrets Act and used it against journalists, as well as operating and refining the racist immigration policies enshrined in Heath's 1971 Immigration Act.

In retreating before capitalism rather than confronting it, the government had undermined itself, alienating rather than mobilising its own working class base. The result was a string of by-election reverses which cut back the government's majority and in 1977 reduced it to a minority in the Commons.

Callaghan resorted to wheeling and dealing in increasingly desperate attempts to cling to office, notably backstage manoeuvres with the SNP and Ulster Unionists, and the "Lib-Lab Pact" of 1977.

Meanwhile, within the Labour Party, at Constituency level, the left was advancing.

The gap between Conference and government grew ever wider, not only on the EEC and economic strategy, but also on nuclear disarmament.

Coupled with this was the growth of a movement for democratic reform of the Party's decision making structures. The issues of mandatory reselection of Labour MPs and the election of Leader and cabinet were pushed to the forefront and given a focus by the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy.

The Tories returned to power in May 1979, under Thatcher's leadership, a powerful indictment of a Labour government which had been a disastrous experience for the working class.

Part 7 of 7

The heyday of Bennism

By Bryn Griffiths (Tottenham CLP) · Labour Briefing no. 79, p. 6 · read by hand from the scan

The three years between Callaghan's 1979 General Election defeat and the 1982 Bishop Stortford declaration marked a high point in left influence in the Labour Party.

The fury at Callaghan's 5% wage limit had strengthened the left. In 1980, the Rank and File Mobilising Committee (RFMC) declared:

"The last Labour government defied the labour movement and made huge cuts... let capitalist chaos take its toll and unemployment rise to over a million...

"tried to impose a 5% pay rise on the trade unions and cut living standards... secretly spent £1,000 million on an updated version of Polaris... Never Again!"

Reform

The RFMC was a united front of left organisations that campaigned for the constitutional reform of the Labour Party.

Its support ranged from Militant and the LPYS to Clause IV and the LCC. By June 1981, it had even persuaded NUPE to sponsor its journal.

The RFMC's campaign for reform was based largely on model resolutions from the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD). Its demand that a Labour government should carry out the policies of the labour movement struck at the heart of labourism.

The RFMC did this by fighting the economistic division of the movement between political (parliamentary) and industrial (trade union).

Enemies

Our enemies clearly understood the importance of those developments. In the Times, Peregrine Worsthorne attacked the reforms, claiming that they were not just an internal Party affair, but a matter of importance to the state.

For Worsthorne, the possibility that trade unions could choose a future Prime Minister through the block vote at Labour Conference was a challenge to the Constitution itself.

During 1981, it looked like Worsthorne's fears might actually be confirmed. A special conference at Wembley in January created an electoral college of Constituency Labour Parties, trade unions, and Labour MPs to elect future leaders.

That summer, Livingstone siezed control of the GLC, Benn waged his Deputy Leadership Campaign, and towards Christmas Scargill was elected NUM President.

My favourite memory of the period was an incident at the demonstration against unemployment (organised by the Labour Party). Both Benn and the despicable Denis Healey were due to speak: unfortunately, Benn could not attend due to illness.

When the Chair read out a message of support from Benn, the crowd rose to its feet for a five minute ovation. An outraged Healey later accused Jon Lansman of somehow organising the entire demonstration to barrack him!

Benn lost his campaign for Deputy by a margin of 0.8%. This marginal defeat turned out to be a watershed.

In January 1982, Trades Unions for a Labour Victory (TULV) held a special conference in Bishop Stortford. The conference had no constitutional status but at its end, it was announced that peace and unity had broken out in the Labour Party.

Under pressure from the trade union leaders, Benn agreed to a formula of "unity around existing policies, membership, and leaders." From then on, Benn was hamstrung — but the old Tribunites and right wingers were not.

Shortly after Bishops Stortford, the witch-hunt commenced.

Party Leader Michael Foot opposed Peter Tatchell's endorsement as the Bermondsey by-election candidate.

By the time Tatchell (whose crime was calling for extra-parliamentary action in the pages of Labour Briefing) was endorsed, the damage was done. Labour was heavily defeated in the February 1983 by-election.

An official register of acceptable groups was agreed at the 1982 Conference. The expulsion of the Militant Editorial Board followed in 1983.

When the trade union leaders who had brought Benn within a whisker of victory withdrew their support, the movement around him began to fragment and collapse.

Limehouse

A key factor behind this withdrawal of trade union support was the 1981 "Limehouse Declaration" by the Gang of Four (Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Shirley Williams, Bill Rogers).

In March (following Labour's Wembley Conference) they formed the SDP. After the split, Labour's opinion poll rating fell from 47.5% (December, 1980) to a low of 23.5% (December 1981).

Leaders

It was against this threat of electoral disaster that the Bishop Stortford declaration was imposed on Tony Benn by the trade union leaders.

Benn's particular weakness was his failure to organise a rank and file base in the trade unions.

In December 1981 (not long before Bishop Stortford) a poll indicated that 40% of Labour voters in the trade unions wanted Benn to carry on his campaign.

Strikes

If these workers had been organised, the defeat of Bennism at Bishop Stortford could have been resisted. The major strikes in the steel industry in 1980 and the railways in 1982 should have been linked to the Bennite constitutional movement.

The lesson of the Bennite years is that we must entrench ourselves in the trade unions and the Labour Party so that we can take advantage of the upheavals that will undoubtedly occur in the future.

It is for these reasons that building Briefing, along with the broader forces in the Socialist Conference movement, is so important.

The Thatcher years seem endless. But we must keep the left intact and prepare for future opportunities.

To do otherwise would be to condemn the next wave of radicalisation to another ignominious defeat — and to forget the lessons of history.